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AMICI CURIAE URGE THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN JUVENILE DEATH
PENALTY CASE
Connie de la Vega*
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Human Rights Advocates, Human Rights Watch, Minne-
sota Advocate for Human Rights, and the Human Rights
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales hereby request
that this Court consider the present brief pursuant to Rule
37.2(a)' in support of Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari. Consent
of Petitioner's Counsel of Record and the State District Attor-
ney's Office has been obtained.2 The interests of Amici are
described in detail in the Appendix.
Amici would like to take the opportunity to develop the
issues regarding the jus cogens norms, and the application of
treaty standards in this case. Amici are specifically con-
cerned that the opinion of the court below raises serious im-
plications as to the ability of federal and state governments to
comply with those treaty standards and international law.
The importance of defining United States treaty obligations
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. J.D., Boalt Hall (School
of Law), U.C. Berkeley; B.A., Scripps College. This paper was originally an
amici curiae brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court in considera-
tion of Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
329 (2001), application of stay of execution denied, 122 S. Ct. 11 (2001). The
brief has been modified for purposes of inclusion in this Law Review's issue
dedicated to the "Death Penalty from an International and Human Rights Law
Perspective" Symposium, held at Santa Clara University on March 15, 2002.
1. SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a).
2. Letters from both counsel consenting to the filing of this brief are being
sent with this brief to the Clerk of this Court. Counsel for a party did not au-
thor this brief in whole or in part. No person or entity, other than the Amici
Curiae, their members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation and submission of the brief.
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and recognizing international law as it relates to the juvenile
death penalty is imperative to the future of domestic compli-
ance with human rights norms. Failure to comply with those
norms is isolating the United States as the lone violator in
the world.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The prohibition against the execution of persons who
were under eighteen years of age at the commission of the
crime is not only customary international law, it has attained
the status of jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international
law. No other nation has executed juvenile offenders at the
rate practiced in the United States. While six other nations
executed juvenile offenders during the past ten years,3 those
countries have either changed their laws raising the age to
eighteen or have in other ways accepted the norm. This
Court must consider this issue before one more execution of a
juvenile offender takes place in the United States. Other-
wise, the United States will continue to bring itself under in-
creasing international scrutiny, tainting its image as a leader
in the protection of human rights.
Because the prohibition against the juvenile death pen-
alty is a jus cogens norm, the reservation by the United
States to Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR") is invalid.4 Because that pro-
vision is self-executing and is being used defensively in a
criminal case, it should apply to Petitioner's case.
This brief, therefore, is submitted in support of the Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari.5 The issues addressed are impor-
3. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia
and Yemen. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
5. Beazley was seventeen when he shot a driver while stealing a car. He
was convicted in Texas of murder and given a death sentence in 1995. He filed
a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, which was denied. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 254-
55 (5th Cir. 2001). On appeal, Beazley argued, among other claims, that the
Texas Penal Code allowing for capital punishment of juveniles was invalid un-
der Article 6(5) of the ICCPR, which was ratified by the United States in 1992.
The United States had reserved the right to impose the death penalty on juve-
niles when it ratified the treaty. Beazley asserted that the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Committee's finding this reservation to be void was "novel" at the
time of his trial, and therefore he could not raise the issue at that time. The
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tant throughout the United States, not just in Texas. Be-
cause of the serious implications of the opinion of the court
below, as well as those of state supreme courts, on the ability
of federal and state governments to comply with treaty stan-
dards and international law, Amici respectfully request that
this Court grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
ARGUMENT
I. The Prohibition Against Executing Juvenile Offenders is
a Jus cogens Norm
Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a jus cogens peremptory norm is "a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." The Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law agrees with this
standard and provides that the norm is established where
there is acceptance and recognition by a "large majority" of
states, even if over dissent by "a very small number of
states."7 Hence, a norm must meet four requirements in or-
der to attain the status of a peremptory norm: 1) it is general
international law; 2) it is accepted by a large majority of
states; 3) it is immune from derogation; and 4) it has not been
modified by a new norm of the same status. The prohibition
against the execution of offenders who were under eighteen at
the time they committed their offense clearly meets those re-
quirements.
A. The Prohibition is General International Law
First, the prohibition against the execution of persons
who were under eighteen at the time they committed their
Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of his appeal on this issue, holding that the
United States' reservation was valid, and that these arguments were in fact
available to Beazley at trial. See id. at 263-67. Therefore, because Beazley did
not raise these issues either in his direct appeal or his state habeas petition,
they were procedurally barred for failure to exhaust. See id. at 264.
6. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 352, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 & re-
porter's note 6 (1986) (citing Report of the Proceedings of the Committee of the
Whole, May 21, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11 at 471-72).
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crime ("juvenile offenders") is general international law.
Numerous treaties, declarations, and pronouncements by in-
ternational bodies, as well as the laws of the vast majority of
nations are evidence of that law. Among the treaties that
prohibit the death penalty for juvenile offenders are the
ICCPR,8 the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"),'
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War ("Fourth Geneva Convention"), and
the American Convention on Human Rights ("American Con-
vention")."
A resolution by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council also opposed the imposition of the death penalty forjuvenile offenders. 1 In 1985, the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted by consensus the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
("The Beijing Rules"), which also oppose capital punishment
for juveniles." Since 1997, the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights has passed resolutions calling on states to
abolish the death penalty generally, but has specifically
asked countries not to impose it for crimes committed by per-
sons below eighteen years of age. 4 The Commission resolu-
8. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 6(5).
9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, art. 37,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1469-70 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). This
convention was adopted by G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.
49, U.N. Doc. A/441736 (1989).
10. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 75 U.N.T.S. 286 [hereinafter Fourth Ge-
neva Convention].
11. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, art. 4(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 146 [hereinafter American Convention].
12. See Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the
Death Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR, Annex, Supp. No. 1, at 33,
U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (1984).
13. G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 53, at 207,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
14. See The Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, 58th Sess., Res. 2002/77, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/22 (2002); TheQuestion of the Death Penalty, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess.,
Res. 2001/68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4IRES/200168 (2001); The Question of the Death
Penalty, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Res. 2000/65, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4RES/2000/65 (2000); The Question of the Death Penalty, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 55th Sess., Res. 1999/61, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (1999); The Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Res. 1998/8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4IRES/1998/8
(1998); The Question of the Death Penalty, U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
53d Sess., Res. 1997/12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/12 (1997).
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tions passed with a number of dissenting votes. The dissent-
ing votes can be attributed to the fact that they also called for
a general moratorium on the death penalty, that a number of
countries still have the death penalty which is not prohibited
by the ICCPR, and that the prohibition is not as widely ac-
cepted. This is supported by the fact that Commission resolu-
tions mentioning only the prohibition against the juvenile
death penalty have passed by consensus without a vote. 5
The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights has passed similar resolu-
tions. In the 1999 resolution, the United States is specifically
mentioned as one of the six countries that had executed juve-
nile offenders since 1990 and that it accounted for ten of the
nineteen executions during that time period. 6 One year later,
the Sub-Commission affirmed "that the imposition of the
death penalty on those aged under eighteen at the time of the
commission of the offence is contrary to customary interna-
tional law." 7 Again, the latter resolution was adopted with-
out a vote.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
body responsible for the protection of fundamental freedoms
in the Organization of American States ("OAS") of which the
United States is a member, found that there is a jus cogens
norm in 1987 proscribing the execution of children among the
OAS member states. 8 While at that time it could not decide
on what the age limit would be for such a norm, it is now
clear that in the OAS system it is eighteen years of age for
the following reasons. The American Convention on Human
Rights expressly limits the death penalty to persons who were
under eighteen years of age at "the time the crime was com-
15. See, e.g., Rights of the Child, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 58"'
Sess., Res. 2002/92, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/200292 I 31 (2002); Human Rights
in the Administration of Justice, in Particular Juvenile Justice, U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Res. 2002/47, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/47
(2002); Rights of the Child, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Res.
2001175, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4JRES/2001/75 T 28(a) (2001).
16. See The Death Penalty, Particularly in Relation to Juvenile Offenders,
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52d
Sess., Res. 1999/4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ Sub.2/RES/1999/4 (1999).
17. The Death Penalty in Relation to Juvenile Offenders, U.N. Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 53d Sess., Res.
2000/17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21RES/2000/17 (2000).
18. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. LJV/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1987).
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mitted."19 The United States is one of only two member states
of the OAS that has not ratified the American Convention."
Of the twenty-four member states that have ratified the
American Convention, only Barbados made a reservation to
Article 4(5) providing that "age is a consideration of the Privy
Council, under Barbadian law 16 was the minimum age for
execution."2 According to the report of the Secretary General
for the United Nations, however, Barbados "brought them-
selves into line" in 1994 with the norm that eighteen is the
minimum age." That report also notes that all but fourteen
countries party to the CRC had national laws prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty on persons who committed
capital offense when under eighteen years of age. 3
B. The Prohibition is Accepted by All States Except One
The second requirement for a jus cogens norm is that the
norm is accepted "by 'a very large majority of States, even if
over dissent by 'a very small number' of states."24 The United
States is the only country in the world that has not accepted
the international norm against the execution of juvenile of-
fenders. The only other countries known to have executed ju-
venile offenders in the last ten years have since abolished the
practice, have acknowledged that such executions were con-
trary to their laws, or have denied that they have taken place.
Almost every nation in the world has ratified the CRC.2"
The only States not to ratify are Somalia, which has no gov-
19. See American Convention, supra note 11, art. 4(5).
20. The Organization of American States maintains a list of signatories and
ratifications to the American Convention that can be accessed through its Web
site address at http://www.oas.org.
21. See id.
22. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Capital Punishment and the
Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of
Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR,
Subst. Sess., 1 21, 90, U.N. Doc. E/2000/3 (2000) [hereinafter Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice].
23. See id.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 reporter's
note 6 (1986) (interpreting the Vienna Convention and citing to Report of the
Proceedings of the Committee of the Whole, May 21, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/11 at 471-72).
25. See Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Report of the
Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess.,
Agenda Item 20, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/99 (1997).
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ernment, and the United States.26 Indeed, the CRC has been
the catalyst that has prompted many countries in the past ten
years to change their laws raising the eligibility age of the
death penalty to eighteen. The United Nations reported that
along with Barbados discussed above, Yemen and Zimbabwe
changed their laws in 1994.27 China changed its age of eight-
een in 1997.28 Indeed, by the time of that report, only four-
teen countries that had ratified the CRC had not changed
their laws to adhere to the prohibition. 9 None of those coun-
tries filed a reservation to Article 37 of the CRC, however,
and only six executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo (1 in 2000), Iran (5: 1 in 1990, 3 in
1992, 1 in 1999), Nigeria (1 in 1997), Pakistan (2: 1 in 1992, 1
in 1997); Saudi Arabia (1 in 1992), and Yemen (1 in 1993).' o
In addition, an execution was documented in Iran in 2000,"1
and one was recently reported in 2001. ;2 Further, despite the
change in law discussed below, Amnesty International re-
ports that there was an execution in Pakistan in November
2001." Even in the United States, there was only one execu-
tion of a juvenile offender in 2001.34
In the six countries besides the United States where ju-
26. See Rights of the Child: Status of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Agenda Item
13, at 2, Annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/74 (2000).
27. See Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, supra note 22, TT 21, 90.
28. See id.
29. See id. The countries were Afghanistan, Burundi, Bangladesh, the De-
mocratic Republic of the Congo, India, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar,
Nigeria (excepting Federal Law), Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates. See id. at 21 & 48 n.36.
30. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE:
DEVELOPMENTS IN 1999 27 tbl. 1 (2000) (AI Index: ACT 50/04/2000); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: KILLING HUMAN DECENCY
12 (2000) (AI Index: AFR 62/007/2000) [hereinafter KILLING HUMAN DECENCY].
31. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHILDREN AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
EXECUTIONS WORLDWIDE SINCE 1990 (2000) (AI Index: ACT 50/010/2000).
32. See UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, May 29, 2001 (AI Index: ACT
53/003/2001). Amnesty International's report regarding that execution states
that Iran executed Mehrdad Youssefi, who was sixteen at the time of the com-
mission of the crime. See News in Brief, DEATH PENALTY NEWS (Amnesty In-
ternational, London), June 2001, at 4.
33. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 2002 (May 28, 2002) (AI Index:
POL 10/001/02).
34. Gerald Mitchell was executed in Texas on October 22, 2001, for a rob-
bery and shooting committed when he was seventeen years old. See Death Pen-
alty Information Center, Executions of Juvenile Offenders (visited May 12,
2002), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/juvexec.html.
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veniles have been executed since 1990, the laws have been
changed or the governments have denied that the executions
of juvenile offenders have taken place. The laws have
changed in Yemen, as noted above, and Pakistan, where the
Juvenile Justice System Ordinance was promulgated in July
2000,"5 banning the death penalty for anyone under eighteen
at the time of the crime.36 In furtherance of the law, Paki-
stan's President Musharraf, at the end of 2001, commuted the
death sentences of 100 young offenders to imprisonment."
Nigeria, as noted in the United Nations report above, has na-
tional legislation setting the minimum age for executions to
eighteen. With respect to the execution in 1997, the Nigerian
government insisted last year to the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights that the offender
was well over eighteen at the time of the offense and reiter-
ated that any juveniles convicted of capital offenses have
their sentences commuted.38 Saudi Arabia has adamantly in-
sisted at the Commission on Human Rights that the allega-
tions regarding the execution of a juvenile in 1992 are un-
true.3 9  While there is documented evidence that the
executions did in fact take place in Nigeria and Saudi Ara-
bia,4o they do appear to be isolated incidents, and the denials
by the governments indicate that those countries have in fact
accepted the norm. While executions of juvenile offenders
seem to have taken place with more frequency in Iran, the
government recently denied at the Commission on Human
Rights meeting that they take place.4'
35. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 2001 186 (2001) (AI Index: POL
10/001/2001); Juvenile Justice Systems Ordinance 2000, available at
http://lhrla.sdnpk.org/link/jul-octO0/JUVENILEORDINANCE.HTML.
36. See id.
37. Press Release, Amnesty International Irish Section, Pakistan: Young
Offenders Taken Off Death Row (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.amnesty.ie/news/2001pakistan4.shtml. This took place after an
execution in November, presumably because the 2000 Ordinance was not retro-
active.
38. See Summary Record of the 6th Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, 52d Sess., 6th mtg. $ 39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/SR.6 (2000).
39. See Summary Record of the 53rd Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, 56th Sess., 53d mtg. 9191 88, 92, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/SR.53
(2000).
40. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 31.
41. See Press Release, United Nations, Commission on Human Rights
Starts Debate on Specific Groups and Individuals (Apr. 11, 2001) (Right of Re-
1048 [Vol. 42
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is in the
midst of a civil war, is also reported to have executed a juve-
nile offender in 2000 despite a moratorium on the death pen-
alty in that country." That execution was carried out by the
Military Order Court rather than through the judicial proc-
ess. 4' This year when four juvenile offenders were sentenced
to death by the Military Order Court, the executions were
stayed and the sentences were commuted following appeals
from the international community.4  Thus, it appears that
even during wartime in that country the military intends to
comply with the international norm.
Hence, only the United States has not accepted the norm
against the execution of juvenile offenders. Even if the re-
ports were true that executions of juveniles took place not
only in the United States but also in Iran and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the adherence to the norm is similar to
those noted in the Restatement (Third) as having had at-
tained peremptory status such as rules prohibiting genocide,
slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other gross violations
of human rights.45 And while United States courts have found
the prohibition against torture to have attained the status of
a jus cogens norm,"' Amnesty International found that 125
countries violated that norm last year alone.47 In stark con-
trast, only three countries violated the norm prohibiting the
41
execution of juvenile offenders the past year.
C. The Norm is Non-Derogable
The prohibition against executing juvenile offenders is
non-derogable. The ICCPR expressly provides that there
ply by Representative of Iran).
42. See KILLING HUMAN DECENCY, supra note 30, at 12.
43. See id.
44. See World Organization Against Torture, Democratic Republic of Congo:
Death Sentences of Five Children Commuted to Life Imprisonment, OMCT
APPEALS Case COD 270401. 1.CC (May 31, 2001).
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 re-
porter's note 6 (1986).
46. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531
(N.D. Cal. 1987).
47. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 35.
48. These countries are the United States, Pakistan and Iran. See supra
notes 32-34.
10492002]
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shall be no derogation from Article 6, which prohibits the im-
position of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.49 The ex-
press prohibition in the treaty, coupled with the wide accep-
tance, as evidenced by treaties, resolutions, national laws and
practice, support the conclusion that the norm is
non-derogable.
D. There is No Emerging Norm Modifying this Norm
As to the fourth and final requirement, there is no emerg-
ing norm that contradicts the current norm. The prohibition
of the juvenile death penalty has been universally accepted by
all but one country." There is thus no question that the pro-
hibition against the execution of persons who were under
eighteen at the time they committed their crime has attained
the status of ajus cogens norm.
II. The Jus cogens Norm Is Applicable to Petitioner's Eighth
Amendment and Treaty Claims
Petitioner is urging that this Court grant certiorari in
this case in order to review the finding that the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution does not pro-
hibit the imposition of the death penalty to juveniles who
were under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission
of their crime." Not only should this Court consider the jus
cogens norm in determining whether the United States Con-
stitution protects against the imposition in this case, but also
whether the Supremacy Clause mandates it." More impor-
tantly, the peremptory norm is relevant to concluding
whether the reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR is void.
If it is void, then the treaty provision applies and can be di-
rectly enforced by the courts because it is self-executing as
discussed below.
A. Jus cogens Norms are Binding in the United States
As this Court has noted, customary international law is
"part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction."53 In this
49. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
50. See supra Part I.B.
51. Beazley v. Johnson, No. 00-10618 (5th Cir. filed July 13, 2001).
52. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
53. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Lea Brilmayer,
1050 [Vol. 42
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regard, the Restatement (Third) provides that "[iinternational
law and international agreements of the United States are
the law of the United States and supreme over the law of the
several States" and "[ciourts in the United States are bound
to give effect to international law and to international agree-
ments of the United States."54 A noted commentator has also
recognized that "as in the case of treaties, American courts
will give effect to the obligations of the United States under
customary law; at the behest of affected private parties,
courts will prevent violations of international law by the
States .... "5 Indeed, seven years ago, Justice Blackmun
noted,
The early architects of our nation were experienced diplo-
mats who appreciated that the law of nations was binding
on the United States. John Jay, the first Chief Justice of
the United States, observed ... that the United States
"had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, be-
come amenable to the laws of nations." Although the Con-
stitution, by Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, gives Congress the power to
"define and punish... [o]ffenses against the Law of Na-
tions," and by Art. VI, cl. 2, identifies treaties as the su-
preme Law of the Land," the task of further defining the
role of international law in the nation's legal fabric has
fallen to the courts ....
As we approach the 100th anniversary of the Paquete Ha-
bana, then, it perhaps is appropriate to remind ourselves
that now, more than ever, "international law is part of our
law" and is entitled to respect of our domestic courts ....
I look forward to the day when the Supreme Court, too,
will inform its opinions almost all the time with a decent
• • • 56
respect to the opinions of mankind.
International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277,
2284 (1991); Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 69-70 (1990); Louis Hen-
kin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1561 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
HARv. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and
Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301
(1999).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1986).
55. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 223 (1972).
56. FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 555 (2d ed. 1996) (citing Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent Respect
to the Opinions of Mankind, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y of Int'l
20021 1051
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The principle that customary international law is part of
United States law applies with greater force when consider-
ing a peremptory norm.57 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Siderman de Blake v. Argentina noted, courts are ob-
ligated to enforce jus cogens norms." The court observed that
"[b]ecause jus cogens norms do not depend solely on the con-
sent of states for their binding force, they 'enjoy the highest
status within the international law.' For example, a treaty
that contravenesjus cogens is considered... to be void...."'
Certainly if a treaty is void for violating a jus cogens norm, a
reservation is void if it does likewise. Not only should this
Court consider the jus cogens norm in determining the pa-
rameters of the evolving standards under the Eighth
Amendment as is urged by the Petitioner, ° but it should also
be used to assess the validity of the United States reserva-
tion.
There is no question when the reservation is considered
in light of the jus cogens norm that it is void.6 If it is void,
the Court must then consider whether the treaty can be ap-
plied directly in the United States. Amici will turn now to
that question.
B. Article 6(5) Can Be Enforced by Courts in the United
States
If the reservation is void, the question is whether Article
6(5) of the ICCPR can be enforced directly by the courts. This
Law, D.C.), Mar.-May 1994, at 1, 6-9).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995);
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation), 25
F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. Paulson, 997 F. Supp.
1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
58. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715-16 (9th
Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 715 (citing to the Vienna Convention).
60. While the Court in the Paquete Habana noted that customary interna-
tional law is looked to "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision," The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900), that does not preclude courts from considering customary international
law or jus cogens norms to determine whether evolving standards of decency
under the Eighth Amendment do include, in the words of the First Chief Jus-
tice, "the law of nations."
61. In addition, Amici agree with Petitioner that the reservation is invalid
because it violates the object and purpose of the treaty itself. See Beazley v.
Johnson, No. 00-10618 (5th Cir. filed July 13, 2001).
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requires an analysis of whether the United States is a party
to the treaty without the reservation and whether the provi-
sion is self-executing. Further, while the Senate declared
that the ICCPR was not self-executing, that declaration does
not apply in this case where the treaty is being used defen-
sively.
62
1. The United States is Still Party to the ICCPR
If the reservation is not valid, the Court must determine
whether the United States is bound by Article 6(5). Under
the view of the Human Rights Committee, the United States
is bound by the provision if the reservation is void. 63  Fur-
thermore, there is a growing international consensus that an
invalid reservation is severed from the document of ratifica-
tion.64 Moreover, broad general reservations are not favored,
particularly in human rights multilateral treaties.65
In the Belilos case," the European Court of Human
Rights held that if a non-essential reservation is invalid, it is
severed and the country submitting the reservation is still a
party to the treaty and bound by the provision without the
reservation. Whether a reservation is non-essential depends
on whether the country's overriding intention was to accept
the obligations under the treaty." There is nothing to indi-
cate that the United States did not have the overriding inten-
tion to accept the ICCPR, and since the reservation to Article
6(5) is invalid, it is bound by its requirements and must be
applied in the United States as the Supreme Law of the Land.
2. Article 6(5) is Self-Executing and the Non-Self-
Executing Declaration Does Not Apply
The Courts have developed the doctrine of
"self-executing" treaties to limit the Constitutional rule that
62. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
63. See General Comment No. 24, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess.,
1382 mtg. at 11, 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21!Rev.1/Add.6 (1994).
64. See Henry J. Bourguignon, The Belilos Case: New Light on Reservations
to Multilateral Treaties, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 347 (1989).
65. See id.
66. See Belilos Case, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), reprinted in 10 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 466 (1988).
67. Id.
68. See Bourguignon, supra note 64, at 382.
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treaties are the law of the land.69 Under that doctrine, only
clauses of treaties that specify duties which directly confer
rights may be enforced directly by the courts.0 Courts have
applied various theories when discussing that doctrine." Un-
der one test, a self-executing clause is "equivalent to an act of
the legislature whenever it operates by itself without the aid
of any legislative provision."72 Another test looks for the "in-
tent of the parties" reflected in the treaty's words and, when
the words are unclear, in circumstances surrounding the
treaty's execution.
The intent of the parties may be difficult to ascertain
when multilateral treaties such as the ICCPR are involved,
and it is questionable that the intent of only one of the parties
would determine the effect of a particular clause. Multilat-
eral treaties rarely make clear the process by which parties
are to incorporate its provisions into national law. 4 Many
countries, such as the United States, incorporate treaties
without separate action by the legislature. 5 Indeed, the
original purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to alter the
British rule that all treaties are "non-self-executing" in order
to require the state courts as well as the federal courts to en-
force treaties directly.
Some courts have listed factors they considered in ascer-
taining intent 7  In Frolova v. USSR, the court fashioned the
69. See Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
70. The holding in Foster was not in complete conformity with prior deci-
sions upholding the application of treaties. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Freder-
ick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Opera-
tion of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 577 (1991). Furthermore, Foster
must be read in conjunction with United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
51 (1833), where the Court admitted error in its first analysis of the treaty in
question. Nonetheless, the basic rule remains, that only clauses of treaties that
specify duties that directly confer rights may be enforced directly with the
courts.
71. See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Trea-
ties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
72. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
73. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
937 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-23 (1899); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536,
539-43 (1884); Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 65-68; Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at
310-16.
74. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 586.
75. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 70, at 575.
76. See Vtzquez, supra note 71, at 698-700.
77. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373
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following factors: the language and purposes of the agreement
as a whole, the circumstances surrounding its execution, the
nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement, the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mecha-
nisms, the implications of permitting a private cause of ac-
tion, and the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dis-
78pute.
Under the Frolova factors, Article 6(5) of the ICCPR is
self-executing. First, the language and purpose of the treaty
are clear-to protect the human rights of individuals. Second,
Article 3 of the ICCPR imposes an obligation to State parties
to provide for effective remedies. It provides as follows:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective rem-
edy, notwithstanding that the violation has been commit-
ted by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his rights thereto determined by competent ju-
dicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any
other competent authority provided for by the legal system
of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted.79
Third, because the United States has not ratified the Op-
tional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8"
which provides for an individual right to petition the Human
Rights Committee, there are no other enforcement mecha-
nisms available. Fourth, since the treaty provides rights to
individuals, there is no reason to believe that individuals
should not have a private cause of action to enforce the provi-
sions. Finally, the judiciary is the most capable institution
for addressing whether the treaty has been violated since it
has traditionally been the means whereby individuals in the
(7th Cir. 1985); People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90,
97 (9th Cir. 1974).
78. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373.
79. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 3.
80. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
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United States enforce their constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the prohibitory language of Article 6(5) is
clear: "Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age . .. "'
Hence, in considering all the relevant factors, the provisions
of that article are self-executing.
Despite the clarity of many of the provisions in the
ICCPR, the Senate ratified it with a declaration that it was
not self-executing.82 It is questionable whether the Senate,
instead of the courts, can make such a determination. 3 Fur-
ther, such a declaration should not be given effect because it
runs counter to the object and purpose of the treaty, which is
to protect the individual rights enumerated therein.84 This
Court, however, need not address those points since the legis-
lative history indicates that the Senate merely intended to
prohibit private and independent causes of action.8" In this
case, Petitioner is not using the treaty to assert a private
cause of action. He is using it defensively and thus is not in-
voking a separate cause of action.86
The defensive use of a treaty is a judicially accepted
means by which litigants have been successful in enforcing
treaty provisions without having courts make a determina-
tion regarding whether the provisions are self-executing. 7
Hence, this Court need not address the non-self-executing
declaration and can apply Article 6(5) to this case.
81. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 6(5).
82. See 138 CONG. REC. S4784, § 111(1) (1992).
83. See Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the
United States Has Been Called Upon to Determine the Legality of the Juvenile
Death Penalty in Michael Domingues v. State of Nevada, 21 WHITTIER L. REV.
215, 220 n.33 (1999).
84. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 70, at 608.
85. See 138 CONG. REC. S4784.
86. See John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in U.S. Courts, 20 HUM. RTS.
Q. 555, 581-82 (1998).
87. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (allowing defensive use
of a treaty to escheat proceeding under Oregon law); Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593 (1927) (allowing use of a treaty as a defense to personal jurisdiction);
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (recognizing the defensive use of a
treaty in a criminal case, but ultimately holding that there was no conflict be-
tween the treaty and state law).
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C. At a Minimum, Article 6(5) is Helpful for
Interpreting United States Standards
Because the United States has ratified the ICCPR, its
provisions should help courts construe the scope of the Eighth
Amendment's final clause. International human rights stan-
dards have often been useful tools for interpreting laws in the
United States.88 Indeed, the United States government told
the Human Rights Committee that "the courts could refer to
the Covenant and take guidance from it." 9
Ratification of treaties is not to be treated lightly, and
such action by the President and two-thirds of the Senate
evidences the acceptance of the treaty. The document should,
therefore, provide meaningful guidance to the Court.
CONCLUSION
There is no clearer precept in international law than the
prohibition of the death penalty for juvenile offenders. The
United States cannot continue to demand compliance with
human rights principles and norms abroad while it refuses to
apply them in its own country. As a branch of the United
States government, this Court has the obligation to consider
whether indeed those principles must be applied not only by
United States federal courts but also by the courts of the fifty
states as well. This Court should grant the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to address the very important issues related to
faithful compliance to United States treaty obligations as well
as international law. For the foregoing reasons, the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
88. See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980). See
generally Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due
Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1993); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Hu-
man Rights Dialogue, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 193 (1999).
89. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg., U.N. Doc.
HR/CT/404 (1995) (statement of Conrad Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State).
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Respectfully submitted,





Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
Human Rights Committee, Bar of England and Wales
APPENDIX
Human Rights Advocates, a California nonprofit corpora-
tion founded in 1978, with national and international mem-
bership, endeavors to advance the cause of human rights to
ensure that the most basic protections are afforded to every-
one. Human Rights Advocates has a Special Consultative
Status in the United Nations. Human Rights Advocates has
duly submitted briefs as amicus curiae in cases involving in-
dividual and group rights where international standards offer
assistance in interpreting both state and federal statutes at
issue.9"
Human Rights Watch is a non-governmental organiza-
tion established in 1978 to monitor and promote observance of
internationally recognized human rights. It also has a Spe-
cial Consultative Status in the United Nations. It regularly
reports on human rights conditions in more than seventy
countries around the world, and it actively promotes legisla-
tion and policies worldwide that advance protections in the
area of domestic and international human rights and hu-
manitarian law.
Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, founded in
1983, is the largest Midwest-based non-governmental organi-
90. Examples of amicus briefs that Human Rights Advocates has filed in-
clude those in the following cases: Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279 (1998),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d
1431 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997); Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); and Hilav v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d
789 (9th Cir. 1996).
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zation engaged in international human rights work. The or-
ganization has some 4,000 members. Minnesota Advocates
for Human Rights also has a Special Consultative Status in
the United Nations. Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
has received international recognition for a broad range of in-
novative programs to promote human rights and prevent the
violation of those rights.
The Bar of England and Wales, through the Human
Rights Committee, appears on behalf of persons whose hu-
man rights are endangered. The Human Rights Committee is
nonpolitical and nonpartisan. Its guiding principle is the be-
lief that no person should be punished for any crime except
after a trial and appeals process that accords with the highest
standards for fairness and the rule of law. Although member
states of the European Community no longer implement capi-
tal punishment, the Human Rights Committee's purpose is
not to challenge the right of the State of Texas to implement
capital punishment in a manner consistent with legal notions
of justice and fairness. Instead, the Bar Council seeks only to
set out international standards in the hope that interna-
tional, English, British Commonwealth and European Court
of Human Rights sources may be of assistance to this Court.
Those international standards are especially relevant because
the United States has ratified the ICCPR, thus evincing a
sincere concern for the norms of international law.9 Further,
the comity among the common-law nations makes the experi-
ence of each persuasive to the other. In particular, the courts
of the United States and of England have often looked to each
other for guidance. For example, the United States Supreme
Court in Enmund v. Florida9 specifically recognized the in-
fluence of international opinion and relied upon it to guide its
determination. The Court noted that the felony murder doc-
trine had been abolished in England.
91. In submitting his proposal for the ratification of the ICCPR to the Sen-
ate for its advice and consent, President George Bush argued that ratification
reflected the role that he envisaged for the United States as a leader amongst
nations. In a letter submitted to Senator Clairborne Pell, Chair of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, President Bush stated that "United States ratifi-
cation of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights at this moment of history
would underscore our natural commitment to fostering democratic values
through international law." President Bush's Letter to Chairman Pell, (Aug. 8,
1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 660.
92. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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